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I  Introduction 
 
The rise of China is a major episode in world economic history. From the late 
1970s, China unleashed market-oriented reform and open policy. During the past two 
decades, China experienced extraordinary growth. Since 1978 GDP growth rates have 
averaged 10 per cent per annum, 10.7 per cent in the 1990s, rivaling the record 
achieved by Japan and the “Four Tigers” (South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong 
and Taiwan province of China) in their fast growing period. 
In a short span of time, China experienced three historic transformations 
simultaneously. First, China is undergoing economic transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. Second, China is undergoing economic development 
from a traditional agricultural economy to an industrialized economy. Third, China is 
changing from autarky to an important player in the arena of world economy and 
politics. China’s experience provides an ideal laboratory for economics research. The 
study of the Chinese economy can not only shed lights on the causes and process of 
this massive growth surge, but also enrich our understanding of policy reform and 
institutional changes. 
With China’s growth occurring at a bewildering speed and arising from complex 
processes, it is not surprising that there has been much debate among economists over 
the basic interpretations of the most important features of China’s success. While 
some scholars tell us “the China Miracle” (Lin, Cai, and Li, 1996), others informed us 
about “Growth without Miracle” (Garnaut and Huang, 2001). Experimentalist School 
highly praise China’s gradual, piecemeal reform and believe the hybrid institutions 
(such as township and village enterprises, or TVEs) reflect the distinctive Chinese 
social and cultural background and are genuine innovation of the Chinese political 
leaders. The convergence school, on the other hand, believes that the institutional 
infrastructure that China needs for long term growth has to converge to the best 
international practices in advanced economies (Sachs and Woo, 2000). 
China’s explosive growth challenges many widely accepted modalities of policy   3
analysis. Private ownership, political democracy, and the rule of law, which are 
proposed by new classical economists as the necessities of economic development, 
were notably absent, at least at the earliest stage of China’s reform. China is just like a 
student who never does his homework, but always outperforms his classmates in 
examinations. Why is the story of China so unique? Is China showcasing a new type 
of economic system that is different from both socialism and market economy but is 
superior to both in stimulating economic performance or China’s experiments are 
mainly the product of political constrains rather than economic optimization? Do we 
have the confidence to say that the past success can guarantee the future prosperity? 
What are the major challenges and constrains that China is facing? 
This paper does not have the ambition to answer all the questions or to convince 
all the audience. We will provide a survey as well as a preliminary analysis on China’s 
economic reform. Section II provides a brief overview of China’s economic 
development from 1949 to present. Section III analyses the economic reform in the 
early 1980s. The planned economy was not sustainable because the government found 
that it is more and more difficult to keep high growth rate and fulfill the goal of full 
employment. The reform toke a gradual approach and the rise of newly rising sector 
(or the non-state sector) made a major contribution the China’s growth. Section IV 
discusses the formation of the triangle of the state-owned-bank (SOB), the 
state-owned-enterprises (SOE), and the government. We believe the equilibrium and 
dynamics among these three key players can largely explain the path and pattern of 
economic reform during the 1980s and 1990s. Section V provides another angle to 
explain China’s economic reform, i.e. the central-local relationship. The competition 
and tension between the central and local government has a tradition of thousands year 
in China and still plays an important role in the formation and evolution of China’s 
economic system. Section VI looking into the future and summarizes the remaining 
tasks for China to accomplish in the near future in order to sustain high economic 
growth and social stability. We argued that China is facing an internal and external 
imbalance and a favorable policy package should help to maintain macroeconomic 
stability in the short term as well as pave the way for sustainable growth in the future.   4
Section VII tries to identify the key elements for a successful reform in China in the 
21
st century. Who should be the strategic triggers for the reform, whether the current 
institutions are supportive to the reform or not and how to find a potential institution 
which can act as a facilitator and coordinator for the reform. 
  
II  Overview 
 
In the early 1950s, GDP per capita in China was less than 119 Yuan or US$ 40 
(current prices). Form 1953 to 1978, China’s annual growth rate of GDP amounted to 
an average of 6.1 per cent. From table 1 we can see that China’s growth in the 1960s 
rate was lower than that of Japan and the “Four Tigers”, but higher than the ASEAN 
countries. In the 1970s, China’s growth was lower than both the “Four Tigers” and the 
ASEAN countries. 
 
Table 1  Economic growth of China, Japan, the “Four Tigers” and the ASEAN  
 
Real GDP Growth (%)  Country or 
region 
1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2000  2001-2005 
China  5.2  5.8  10.2  10.1  8.9 
Japan  10.9  5.0  4.0  1.2  1.4 
South 
Korea 
8.6  9.5  9.4  6.1  4.5 
Taiwan 
province 
9.2  9.7  7.1  6.5  3.1 
Hong 
Kong 
10.0  9.3  6.9  4.5  4.3 
Singapore  8.8  8.5  6.4  7.8  3.9 
Indonesia  3.9  7.6  6.1  4.0  4.7 
Malaysia  6.5  7.8  5.2  7.1  4.5 
Philippines  5.1  6.3  1.0  2.9  4.5 
Thailand  8.4  7.2  7.6  4.4  5.0 
Sources: World Bank, various years; Asian Development Bank and IMF (2006). 
China’s data are from China Statistics Yearbook, 2005. 
 
During this period, although comparatively speaking, China’s economic growth   5
was very remarkable, but the growth rate was not stable. The process of growth was 
frequently interrupted by political campaigns like the “Great Leap Forward” in 1958 
and the “Cultural Revolution” from 1966 to 1976. Eckstein (1977) pointed out that 
China’s economic growth experienced “policy cycle”. China’s economic policies 
changed so quickly that they had hardly gone on for three years, which lead to the 
boom and burst of the Chinese economy. 
In the late 1970s, China embarked on a major program of economic reform. The 
last two decades witnessed the dramatic transformation of the Chinese economy. 
During this period, the average annual growth rate of real GDP was 9.52 per cent. In 
1980, per capita income in China was RMB 460 Yuan (less than US$ 150)， and in 2004, 
this figure reached RMB 10,128Yuan (or US$1,224),with major cities such as Beijing 
and Shanghai approaching US$ 2500. Even taken inflation into consideration, Chinese 
people’s living standard rose almost 6 times in the last 20 years. If calculated on a 
purchasing power basis, the increase of the size of Chinese economy is even more 
impressive. The IMF found that on a purchasing power basis the Chinese economy in 
1990 accounted for just over 6 percent of world output, ranking third behind the United 
States and Japan (IMF, 1993). A more recent research by the World Bank suggests that 
based on purchasing power parity China ranked the second largest economy in the 
world only behind the United States (World Bank, 1997).   
Before China launched its open door policy from the late 1970s, it was isolated 
from the world economy. China’s export was only US$ 18 billion in 1978, its share of 
world trade was only 0.6 per cent. China was the 34th largest exporting country in the 
world. In the last two decades, China quickly transformed itself to an important trading 
power. Its foreign trade has increased almost 15 percent annually in the past 20 years. 
In less than two decades, the total value of China’s export has expanded more than 
20-fold. In 2005 China’s export was US$ 762 billion, its import was US$ 660 billion. 
The ratio of trade dependence, which measured by the ratio of the sum of import and 
export to GDP, was about 63 per cent.   
In the late 1970s China was also a negligible participant in world capital markets. 
China rarely had any foreign direct investment or foreign debt before the economic   6
reform. This situation did not change much in early 1980s. Total foreign investment 
from 1979 to 1982 was less than $12.5 billion, an average of about $3 billion per year. 
In early 1990s, China launched a new round of reforms and adopted more open 
foreign-investment policies. After that China experienced a dramatic increasing of the 
FDI. Attracted by high expected returns and tax exemptions, FDI inflow increased by 
almost 50 percent annually from 1992 to 1996. The trend has continued even after the 
Asian Financial Crisis. From 1993 China began to attract far more foreign direct 
investment than any other developing country. In 2005, the FDI flowing to China was 
$ 72.4 billion, following the United Kingdom and United States (Ministry of 
Commerce, 2006). 
From other indicators, the change of China is also very impressive. Life 
expectancy at birth from 1960 to 1965 was 36.3, the lowest in East Asia. During the 
past thirty years this figure increased continuously and more than doubled. In the year 
2005, life expectancy at birth was 70 for male and 74 for female (WHO,2006). 
Around 80% of China’s population was illiterate before 1949. By the mid-1990s, 
China had achieved virtually universal enrollment in primary education (Wang and 
Yao, 2001). 
The widening income disparity in China has caught much attention recently. 
According to Chinese official statistics, the Gini coefficient of China rose from a low 
level of 0.33 in 1980, to 0.40 in 1994, and to 0.45 in 2002(UNDP,2005). China’s 
current income gap has surpassed those in India and Ethiopia and is now among those 
countries with  the most unequal distribution in the world. The deteriorating trend for 
China’s income distribution is the result of the urban-rural gap and the regional 
disparity. The income gap between the rural and urban area decreased at the beginning 
of economic reform owing to substantial growth of rural household income. However, 
since the mid 1980s, the rural-urban gap has been widened. The ratio of urban income 
over rural income rose up from 1.71 in 1984 to 3.23 in 2003. The uneven regional 
income gap between the coastal area and the inland area was expanding in recent years. 
 
Table 2  Regional disparity: per capita Disposable income of urban household (Yuan)   7
 
Region  1981  1989  1993  1996  1998  2001  2004 
Average  458  1261  2337  4377  5425  6860  9422 
East region  476  1441  3140  5371  6574  8887  1190
1 
Central region  397  1084  2118  3576  4492  5745  7886 
Western region  468  1200  2287  3733  4665  6171  7996 
Source: China statistics yearbook, 2005. 
 
Table 3  Regional disparity: per capita net income of rural household (Yuan)   
 
Region  1978  1985  1992  1995  1998  2001  2004 
Average  133.6  397.6  784.0  1577.7  2162.0  2336.4  2936.4 
East region  164.1  513.0  1156.1  2346.1  3154.3  3832.1  4739.2 
Central 
region 
131.5  380.3  711.7  1422.3  2054.3  2177.1  2770.3 
Western 
region 
120.0  322.6  619.0  1051.6  1476.4  1692.7  2291.3 
Source: China statistics yearbook, 2005. 
 
III  The political economy of the 1978 reform 
 
What was the impetus of the market oriented reform in China? Many papers hold 
that the inefficiency of the planned economy made it unsustainable. However, this 
theory can not explain the timing of the reform. In our paper (Zhang and He, 1998), we 
argued that the fiscal pressure faced by the government triggered market-oriented 
reform. 
The relation between fiscal deficit and institutional change originated from 
Schumpter (1918). He pointed out that “the method of studying fiscal conditions is 
especially useful to analyze the turning point of social development”. A first glimpse 
may led people to doubt whether this Schumpter’s Law can apply to China’s case. 
From table 5 we can see in the late 1970s, only 1974, 1975, 1976 of that eight years 
had deficit. The deficit in 1976 was the largest, but accounted only for 3.81 per cent of 
total government revenue and 1.01 percent of GDP.   8
However, as we have pointed out, in the planned economy, since the government 
controlled the allocation of capital, the financial account automatically balanced. The 
official figure of government budget hind the real cost of the planned economy. In 
order to maintain their legitimacy, political leaders have to maintain high economic 
growth as well as achieve the goal of full employment. In the eve of economic reform, 
these two goals became more and more difficult and even impossible. Without reform, 
a fiscal crisis as well as legitimacy crisis will come in no time. 
 
Table 5  Fiscal deficits in the late 1970s 
 






Balance  Deficit/revenue  Deficit/GDP 
1971  744.73  732.17  12.56  1.69  0.52 
1972  766.56  765.86  0.7  0.09  0.03 
1973  809.67  808.78  0.89  0.11  0.03 
1974  783.14  790.25  -7.11  -0.91  -0.26 
1975  815.61  820.88  -5.27  -0.65  -0.18 
1976  776.58  806.20  -29.62  -3.81  -1.01 
1977  874.46  843.53  30.93  3.54  0.97 
1978  1132.26  1122.09  10.17  0.90  0.28 
Note: the unit of revenue and expenditure is 100 million Yuan 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000. 
 
First, in the late 1970s, the capital-output ratio increased sharply, which means the 
government has to inject more and more money to the state-owned sector in order to 
sustain the previous growth rate. This induced financial pressure on the government 
and gradually the growth rate declined and so did people’s living standard. Thus the 
source for government revenue shrunk and the discontentment of the people 
accumulated. 
Second, in the planned economy, with the growth of population and the increase of 
labor supply, the government found it more and more difficult to provide job for 
everyone. Because of the budget constrain, only a small proportion of whole   9
population can obtain the welfare and other amenities. The fixed number of job 
position and the growing number of new labors including the younger generation in 
cities was in sharp contradiction. Many college student and high school student fell 
into the force of unemployment the same day as they graduated. The last resort of the 
government was to send tens of millions of young students ( “Zhishiqingnian”, which 
means educated young people) to the countryside. From 1962 to 1978, 17 million 
young students whose families were in cities had to leave their parents and were sent to 
Dongbei, Neimeng, Yunnan and other remote rural areas, while almost all students 
whose families were in the rural area had to go back (Liu, 1998). In 1978 this policy 
was finally adjusted, millions of young people came back to cities and cheered the 
family reunion. This policy highly increased the legitimacy of the new government led 
by Deng Xiaoping and his comrades. But the result is that the government then faced a 
serious fiscal problem. If the government still provided jobs for every unemployed 
“zhishiqingnian” by government budget, the total expenditure would be about 4-5 
times of the annual government revenue (He, 1998). 
The reform started from the late 1970s and adopted a gradualist approach. More 
autonomy was given to enterprises, individuals and local governments to improve their 
incentives. The government withdrew from direct intervention mainly to get rid of the 
heavy fiscal burden. Household responsibility system was introduced in the rural area. 
After paying contributions to the government, peasants can have residual claims. In 
1978 when a rare drought hit Anhui province, several villages adopted the household 
responsibility system secretly. The government chose to endorse this grass root reform 
for fear that without giving autonomy to the peasants, another famine may come and 
shake the legitimacy of the government. Household responsibility system got spread 
quickly and within 5 years and in 1983 covered 93 per cent of the rural villages. The 
impact was almost immediate: Agricultural productivity increased substantially and so 
did rural people’s income. As Chinese economist Wu Jinglian pointed out: “The 
emphasis of economic reform had been put on the state-owned industry for the on forth 
century from 1950s to 1980s, but no breakthrough it was only after the wide 
implementation of household responsibility system that reform showed a promising   10
future.” (Wu, 1999) 
Efficiency improvement in agriculture created grain surplus and extra labor. With 
the rise of income level and demand for goods, Town and Village enterprises (TVEs) 
mushroomed and became a driving force for China’s growth. There is an on-going 
debate about whether China’s rapid growth during the reform period is mainly driven 
by productivity or factor accumulation. Chow (1993) concludes that from 1952 to 
1980 capital formation played a principle role in China's economic growth while there 
was nearly no technological progress. For the reform period since 1978, Borensztein 
and Ostry (1996) find that the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) rose to an 
average 3.8 percent per year and accounted for more than one-third of the total increase 
in output. Non state sector including TVEs and later the joint ventures has been 
growing rapidly and attracting more and more labor. This labor mobility has proven to 
be one of the most important sources of productivity gains. During this process, non 
state sectors also alleviated the unemployment pressure. 
The reform in the early stage was Pareto-improving. Vested interested groups did 
not lose their privilege while at the same time, the rest of people bettered off. In 1980s 
the Chinese government tried to copy the success of rural reform and introduced a 
similar contract responsibility system in SOEs. However, the situation in SOEs was 
quite different. Like what happened in other transitional economies, “insider control”, 
which is the coalition between managers and workers, was rampant in SOEs. Salary 
and bonus increased very fast at the price of the falling of profits. SOEs provided 
larger housing, more job provision and other welfares. 
 
V  The triangle among SOEs, SOBs and the government 
 
A natural result of the gradualist approach is that the distribution of the national 
income became tilted to individuals rather than the government. As a result, the share 
of government revenue in GDP dropped sharply from 31.2 percent to 22.4 percent in 
1985 and 10.8 percent in 1996. 
As its fiscal capacity declined, the government begun to shift the burden of raising   11
funds to support SOEs to state-owned banks. Government intervention of economic 
activities was still pervasive, although less obvious. In 1984, PBC transferred its 
commercial banking function to the newly founded four specialized banks and assume 
the role of central bank. The monobank system now evolved into a two-tier system. 
The reform of “loan for grant” started from 1983. From then on SOEs turned to the 
state-owned banks for their funding. The debt ratio of SOEs increased substantially 
and in the 1990s this ratio was still above 80 percent. 
Fiscal weakness and lack of modern social safety network made government has to 
count on SOEs to protect employment and provide social welfares. This approach 
scarified economic efficiency but could avoid social turmoil associated with “shock 
therapy”. SOEs were more like communities than profit maximizing units. Most SOEs 
have their own kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. The heavy social burden greatly 
hurt the competitiveness of the SOEs and eroded their profitability, which in turn 
resulted in the accumulation of NPL in China’s banking sector. Government 
interventions also make it more difficult to evaluate the performance of the banks. The 
bank managers can easily shift their responsibility of bad loans to government since it 
is difficult or even impossible to distinguish the commercial losses and the 
intervention-induced losses. 
At the first stage of China’s reform, the triangle relationship between the 
government budget, SOEs and state-owned banks seemed very stable. Because of the 
high economic growth and the Pareto improvement nature of the reform, disposable 
income of household increased dramatically. Most of their money went to the 
state-owned banks because people did not have other alternatives to invest. More than 
60 percent of the individual financial assets are in the form of bank deposits. The 
state-owned banks successfully collected money from households, and then the 
government can conveniently utilize sate-owned banks to transfer private savings to 
SOEs. 
Local government reinforced the “iron triangle” between the government budget, 
SOEs, and state-owned banks. Not like other planned economies, most of Chinese 
enterprises are of small and medium size and local governments own most of the SOEs.   12
Local governments have even stronger incentive to protect local enterprises. For a long 
time, the branches of the state-owned banks are in parallel with the administration 
hierarchy. State-owned banks set their branches and affiliates in every province, every 
city. Because they were so closely related to local politics, branch managers often 
found themselves in a very difficult situation if they wanted to cut the loans to ailing 
SOEs. These branch managers faced with asymmetric incentive: if they agreed to gave 
loans to the SOEs but it turned out to be bad loans, they can use government 
intervention as escape goat; if they extend loans at the will of the local officers, they 
can improve the relationship with the local government and get rents. Thus it not 
surprise to see that branch managers always have an impulsion to maximize their 
lending and then forced the central bank to issue more money to finance their lending 
losses. This resulted in the inflation pressure and to a large extend decided the 
boom-burst cycle in the socialist economic system. 
Soft budget constrain facing by SOEs and the moral hazard problem resulting from 
government intervention makes a large proportion of loans extended to SOEs 
unrecoverable. Yet the funding keeps flowing into the state-owned sector. On the other 
hand, the vigorous and competitive non state-owned economy already accounted for 
75 percent of total output and more than 50 percent of employment in urban areas, but 
they cannot get sufficient financial support from the state-owned banks. 
We sketched the complexity and the interconnectedness of reforms in SOEs, and 
in financial and fiscal areas. From the above discussion we can see that the banks’ 
problem is actually the problem of the ailing SOEs, and SOEs’ problem is actually the 
problem of an ill-functioning public finance system. Fiscal weakness is Chinese 
economy’s Achilles Heel. How to solve the problem? The answer lies partly in 
strengthening fiscal revenue and domestic capital markets and partly in developing as 
quickly as possible a modern and social security system. 
 
 
VI  The central-local relationship 
   13
One critical components of China’s economic transition is decentralization. More 
autonomies were given to local governments and enterprises. Generally speaking, 
decentralization helps to encourage local reform experiments and also give local 
officials strong incentives to stimulate economic growth. But at the same time, 
decentralization also revealed and even deteriorated some of the deep-rooted problems 
in China’s economic and political system: local protectionism, rampant corruption, 
increased inequality, etc.  
It should be noticed that even before China’s market-oriented reform, the 
economic structure in China is quite diversified. China never achieved a highly 
specialized and nationwide planned economy as that of the Soviet Union. China’s 
economy consisted of parallel, to a great extent self-sufficient provincial economies. 
Using the vocabulary of Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975), Qian and Xu (1993) 
compare the Chinese economy to a multi-divisional (M-form) and the Soviet Union to 
a unitary (U-form) organization. 
During the traditional planned economy, all revenues accrued to the central 
government and all expenditures were also budgeted by the central government. Local 
governments were responsible for collecting taxes but they have to remit most of their 
collection to the central and wait for the central to assign expenditures to them. As the 
agency of the central government, local governments did not have much discretion on 
their spending. Most of the fiscal revenue came from the profits of the state-owned 
enterprises. Thus the tax administration system was quite simple and crude. There 
were relatively few taxpayers (SOEs) and the account of SOEs were easy to monitor 
since the government already controlled the price and production plan. 
The fiscal pressure at the end 1970s led to a series of major reform endeavors 
which shaped China’s central-local relations. Contractual revenue sharing system was 
introduced in early 1980s. Central and local governments were asked to “eat in 
separate kitchens” (fen-zao-chi-fan), which means the central and local governments 
now had their separate revenues. The central government negotiated with each 
provinces regarding the contractual terms of shared revenues. But these contracts 
highly reflected the bargaining power of each province against the central and led to   14
widening disparities among different provinces. Although the central revised these 
contracts several times attempting to change the situation, the central-local 
government relationship remained uncoordinated and changeable。 
Although the revenue-sharing system provided a strong incentive for the local 
governments to promote economic growth, it also encouraged them to minimize the 
amounts of revenues remitted to the central. Local governments tried to transfer more 
revenues to their own pockets and as a result, extra-budgetary and off-budget funds 
expanded. A major source of off-budget funds for the local governments is profits 
from local enterprises. Thus local governments then were motivated to control local 
private enterprises in order to secure their own revenue streams.  
As a result, the central government’s share of total budgetary revenue declined from 
51% in 1979 to 28% in 1993, while the ratio of total (local and central) budgetary 
revenue-to-GDP decreased from 29% to 13% (Ma and Norregaard 1998). A climate of 
distrust surrounded intergovernmental fiscal relations. The central government blamed 
the local for the continuing fiscal decline and the local saw the repeated changes in 
revenue sharing rules as a lack of credibility of the central government. The 
deteriorating and chaos fiscal position in the early 1990s led the central government to 
launch a radical reform in 1994. Revenue sharing system was replaced by a tax share 
system which redefined the assignment of revenue between the central and the local. 
1 
The purposes of the 1994 fiscal reform were not only to provide sufficient revenue 
for government, especially the central government, but also to redesign the tax 
                                                        
1 Central taxes include customs duties, the consumption tax, VAT revenues collected by customs, 
income taxes from central enterprises, banks and nonbank financial intermediaries; the remitted 
profits, income taxes, business taxes, and urban construction and maintenance taxes of the railroad, 
bank headquarters and insurance companies; and resource taxes on offshore oil extraction. 
Local taxes consist of business taxes (excluding those named above as central fixed incomes), 
income taxes and profit remittances of local enterprises, urban land use taxes, personal income 
taxes, the fixed asset investment orientation tax, urban construction and maintenance tax, real 
estate taxes, vehicle utilization tax, the stamp tax, animal slaughter tax, agricultural taxes, title 
tax, capital gains tax on land, state land sales revenues, resource taxes derived from land-based 
resources, and the securities trading tax. Only the VAT is shared, at the fixed rate of 75 percent 
for the central and 25 percent for the local (Wong, 2000). 
central government, and 25 percent for local governments   15
structure and eliminate its distortions. From 1996, the revenue- GDP ratio started to 
increase. In 1996 it was 10.9 per cent and in 2004 it reached 19.3 per cent. The share of 
the central government in the total revenue increased substantially from 22 per cent in 
1993 to 55.7 per cent in 1994. Since then the share of the central in the total revenue 
declined slightly in the late 1990s but increased again from 1998. In 2004 this figure 
was 54.9 per cent (see table 6). While more revenue went to the central government, 
the transfer payment from the central to local remains grossly under-funded.  
The issue of extra-budgetary and off budget financing of local government 
appeared to have worsened after the reform. The 1994 fiscal reform only stressed the 
reassignment of revenue, but the expenditure assignments were left untouched. Local 
governments are responsible for the financing of social safety networks and minimum 
income support, as well as building new infrastructures and providing urban utilities. 
Local governments faced more intensive pressures to collect enough revenue. As a 
result, they have to rely on extra-budgetary and off budget financing. A usual practice 
was to establish government owned companies and use these companies to borrow 
money from banks. In recent years local governments became more and more 
enthusiasm on land sale because this becomes the major source for the local 
governments to increase their revenues. In 2003, 42.5 per cent of the local government 
revenue was off budget, and the share of off budget expenditure to total local 
expenditure was only 22.2 per cent. This implies that some of the off budget revenue 
was actually used to finance the basic service expenditure since the local government 
can not levy enough tax to cover these items (Hussin, 2006). 
 
Table 6 share of the central in total revenue and expenditure (%) 
 
year  Revenue  expenditure 
1978  15.5  47.4 
1979  20.2  51.1 
1980  24.5  54.3 
1981  26.5  55.0 
1982  28.6  53.0 
1983  35.8  53.9   16
1984  40.5  52.5 
1985  38.4  39.7 
1986  36.7  37.9 
1987  33.7  37.4 
1988  32.9  33.9 
1989  30.9  31.5 
1990  33.8  32.6 
1991  29.8  32.2 
1992  28.1  31.3 
1993  22.0  28.3 
1994  55.4  30.3 
1995  52.2  29.2 
1996  49.4  27.1 
1997  48.9  27.4 
1998  49.5  28.9 
1999  51.1  31.5 
2000  52.2  34.7 
2001  52.4  30.5 
2002  55.0  30.7 
2003  54.6  30.1 
2004  54.9  27.7 
Source: http;//stats.gov.cn 
 
The behaviors of the central and local government can largely be explained by the 
fiscal constrains they are facing. With deteriorating fiscal situation, each level of 
government try to shake off the tedious fiscal burden to lower level government and to 
guarantee enough revenue for itself. The responsibility of providing public goods was 
gradually shifted to the lowest level of government, the county and village 
governments. County and village level government now cover 70 per cent of the 
expenditure on rural education and 55-60 per cent of the expenditure on rural public 
health service. The fierce competition among local government to attract foreign 
investments, their unbound avarice to grab land from farmers, their haste to sell SOEs, 
can all be attributed partly to the mismatch between revenues and expenditure 
responsibilities for the local governments. 
We do not see the so-called pro-market local government has became a check and 
balance to the central government. It’s too simplistic to picture the local governments 
as reformists while the central are conservatives. The competition among local   17
governments is actually good news for the central because they can use yardstick 
competition to evaluate local officials’ performance. When there are disobedient in the 
local, the central did not find difficult to fire those defiant provincial governors and 
impose its policy，as in the case of Beijing governor Chen Xitong and Shanghai 
governor Chen Liangyu. 
 
 
Ⅷ Unfinished revolution: Chinese Economy at a turning point 
 
High economic growth is so important for China that if it drops a little bit to, say, 7 
per cent, we will regard that as a recession. Why so? My favorite metaphor is inspired 
by the Hollywood movie Speed. A terrorist has set a bomb under a bus. If the speed of 
that bus slows down, the bomb will explode, if the speed is too fast, the bomb will 
explode too. China is in a similar situation. A lot of problems lay underneath the high 
growth: increasing inequality, massive pollution, a fragile financial system, emerging 
issues like energy security and political reform. We cannot stop the bus to dismantle 
the bomb. We cannot stop economic growth to reform the system. High growth can 
facilitate economic reform. It’s much easier to launch a reform plan when the economy 
is growing fast. Growth provides more revenue for the economy as a whole and part of 
the new revenue can be used to compensate the losers and avoid backlashes. Growth 
also increases the credibility of the government, which is very important for the 
success of policy. Recession, on the other hand, sends a signal about the incompetence 
of the government and ignites distrust as well as discontent in society. 
It’s safe to say that in the near future, China is able to sustain quite robust economic 
growth. If so, why should we bother to reform the economy? The problem is, China 
has entered a new era in its development process with a set of challenges largely 
different from those of the recent past. Some of these challenges have arisen from the 
very pattern and success of high growth since reforms began. If these challenges 
cannot be handled properly – and many argue China has left the harder fiscal reforms 
until last - China will lose its momentum of growth and, worse, the fruit of successful   18
reform could be ruined by the resulting widespread discontent and instability.  
The major challenge for the Chinese government is how to handle the internal and 
external imbalance and reorient the growth to a more sustainable path. Savings are 
high, consumption is low and investment inefficient. Even compared with other East 
Asian economies, China’s savings rate is still extraordinarily high. One reason for this 
is the precautionary saving habits of the household. The lack of a social safety net and 
the anxiety brought about by rapid social transformation are factors that cause Chinese 
people to save more. In most rural areas, for example, there is no medical insurance 
and or any form of insurance to support the elderly. Another reason for cautious 
consumption is that though government revenue increased dramatically in the last few 
years, it has mainly been channeled to investments on infrastructure projects like 
highways and airports, rather than public expenditures on health, education and other 
‘public goods’. Without sufficient supply, the prices for those public goods remain 
high and a once universal welfare system has fallen apart. In recent years, enterprise 
saving has increased dramatically. Most of the profits went to a handful of large 
monopolistic SOEs and they kept the profits in their own companies and own sectors. 
Small and medium sized enterprises, however, always have difficulty getting loans 
from the banks, needless to say getting listed on the stock markets, so they have to rely 
on self finance. They are saving their profit for investment.  
 
Table 7 Saving rate and the distribution of saving (%) 
 














1992  40.3  31.1  31.0  52.3  14.6  30.5  2.5 
1993  41.7  29.9  32.4  46.3  15.0  36.0  2.8 
1994  42.7  32.6  29.0  50.3  12.2  35.4  2.1 
1995  41.6  30.0  29.6  48.2  11.7  38.3  1.8 
1996  40.3  30.8  31.7  52.9  13.5  31.4  2.2 
1997  40.8  30.5  32.3  50.9  13.8  34.3  1.0 
1998  40.0  29.9  30.0  51.0  13.2  34.3  1.5 
1999  38.6  27.6  31.0  48.0  14.9  35.6  1.4   19
2000  38.5  25.5  32.5  42.8  16.5  39.1  1.5 
2001  38.9  25.4  35.9  41.6  19.5  38.2  0.8 
Source: China Annual of Statistics, 1999-2004 
 
With domestic saving rising faster than investment, China’s trade surplus, which is 
equivalent to the savings surplus, has increased. Usually, when one country has a trade 
surplus, it will invest the revenue abroad and thus support a capital account deficit. 
China, on the contrary, has a ‘twin surplus’ of both the current account and capital 
account. This puzzling phenomenon can be partly explained by the ‘round tripping’ of 
Chinese capital going abroad and then coming back to China in the form of foreign 
capital to take advantage of preferential policies. This happens when Chinese citizens 
register companies off-shore. They re-invest in China and their revenues are judged by 
some to account for as much as 50 per cent of foreign direct investment. The external 
imbalance has two results: first, China has accumulated a large amount of foreign 
exchange reserve (now more than US$1 trillion). Although a country needs foreign 
exchange for paying its foreign trade and debts, too much of it becomes a burden. 
China invests between 70 and 80 per cent of its foreign exchange reserve on US$ 
assets, mainly US treasury bonds. The return ratios of US treasury bonds are so low 
that, taking inflation and operational costs into consideration, China can hardly break 
even. Further depreciation of the US dollar also exposes China’s foreign exchange 
reserve to more risks. Second, the pressure for RMB (‘Renminbi’ (RMB) means 
‘People''s Currency’) to appreciate becomes an imperative challenge for the Chinese 
government. The appreciation of RMB will lead to a decrease of exports and increase 
of imports, thus directly reducing the trade surplus. But radical appreciation will have a 
negative impact both on the Chinese economy and the world economy. 
On July 21, 2005, the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China, 
announced its decision to adjust the exchange rate policy. It revalued the exchange rate 
of RMB against the US$ by 2 per cent and declared that the exchange rate would be 
decided by referring to a currency basket. However, 2 per cent is way below the 
widespread perception in the market of an appreciation of 5-10 per cent. The ambiguity   20
of the new regime discourages import and export enterprises because the price and 
profits are becoming unpredictable. It’s important to set the rule clearly and adhere to 
the new rules. However, simply adjusting the exchange rate is not sufficient to correct 
the imbalances in the Chinese economy, because China’s trade sector does not seem to 
be very sensitive to the change. Appreciation of the RMB also has an undesirable 
income-distribution effect because imported agricultural products are cheaper and the 
market for domestic agricultural products will shrink and in turn lead to a decline of 
the income of rural farmers. 
A more appropriate policy should be the increase of domestic expenditure. An 
increase in expenditure will lead to an increase in imports, and a decrease in the 
amount of domestic products available for export, thus achieving a trade balance. An 
increase of public investment will also reduce the gap between domestic saving and 
investment, and drag China back to a more balanced path of growth. Compared with 
other countries and even developing countries with the same income level, China’s 







Table 8 social expenditure of selected countries ( as share of GDP) 
  Education  Public health 
Australia  4.8  6.4 
Japan  3.7  6.4 
Korea  4.6  2.8 
India  3.3  1.2 
Brazil  4.1  3.4 
Russia  3.7  3.3 
Indonesia  3.3  1.2 
Thailand  4.2  2.0 
China  2.3  0.5 
Source: UNESCO institute of Statistics (2006) online database of Education   21
Indicators and WHO (2006) World Health Report. 
 
The fiscal situation in China is very healthy. The primary deficit to GDP ratio is 
below 2 per cent, and the public debt to GDP ratio is only 26 per cent. In the last few 
years, the growth rate of taxation outpaced the GDP growth rate by more then 10 per 
cent. It’s fair to say that China still has quite a lot of potential to borrow money today 
without worrying about the burden of accumulated debt in the future.  
If we agree on increasing public expenditure, then where should we allocate the 
money? The public expenditure program should be concentrated on broad strategic 
areas that are more likely to create the conditions for future growth. It could include 
rebuilding a well-functioning social safety net for both urban and rural populations; 
increasing investment in human capital by providing better health and education; 
internal transportation and communication infrastructure to help achieve a more 
integrated domestic economy; and a rural development program for the poorest regions 
which have been left behind by the boom on the East coast and many of the 43 
megacities. The new government is promoting a harmonious society; but a harmonious 
society can be achieved only by providing sufficient public goods as well as speeding 
up economic reforms. 
Many economists worry that public expenditure programs will lead to massive 
government intervention and corruption. This concern is legitimate and the public 
expenditure program should be carefully planned. But, compared with the past practice 
by which local government got their funding mainly through bank lending, financing 
them through the budget system is more transparent and easier to oversee. Modern 
history shows that democracy is not an artificially designed regime, but stems from the 
endless quarrelling, bargaining and compromising in the budget process. A 
well-functioning public finance system is the constitution for the market economy 
since it defines the boundaries between the government and the market. China can be 
transformed into a more prosperous, open and dynamic country by a public 
expenditure program and its hidden agenda.  
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Ⅸ  A new agenda for China’s economic reform 
 
China’s economic reform indicates that market economy is more than price 
liberalization and privatization. Many supporting institutions are equally important. 
During the transition period, sometimes we can not pursue the first best solution 
directly and have to accept the second best solutions. Without a blueprint and well 
design plan, China has been muddling through all the unpredictable and complex 
situations and achieved remarkable success.  
However, the “cross the river by touching the stone” approach adopted by the first 
generation reformist can not guarantee that China can sustain its vigor. Without a 
comprehensive and foreword looking plan, China’s economy may stuck in the mud 
and lose its momentum. The issues that the second generation reformists now 
confronted are quite different from their predecessors and a deeper process of reform is 
required.  
The first generation reformists are charismatic political leaders. A small handful 
of leaders can rely on the leverage of authoritarian political system to pursue market 
oriented reform. Give more freedom to the farmers then there was no famine. Give 
more freedom to private entrepreneurs then all kinds of non-SOEs mushroomed. Give 
more freedom to local government officials then they changed themselves from 
communist disciples to market economy preachers. All these reforms are politically 
difficult but technically simple. Let there be light. Then there was light. Second 
generation reformists are promoted from lower rank bureaucrats. They do not have the 
aureole of the first generation political leaders. For most of the time, they have to make 
compromise with their peers and even subordinates. Thus it’s understandable that the 
style of the new generation is consensus building. They are more careful and cautious. 
This approach prevents the government making fatal mistakes but it may also cause the 
government to miss the best opportunities. 
The good news is that there exists a surprising consensus across different levels of 
government and also the society on the need for reform. The central government must 
tap this sentiment to work out a comprehensive set of changes. Public finance system,   23
financial sector reform, and social programs like education and public health should be 
put on the priority of this new agenda for reform. The package of reforms will be 
complex, difficult and protracted. The second generation reform requires the political 
leaders to cooperate with both the local officials and officials from different 
departments of the Chinese government, and convene enough support from the society. 
Tensions between the central and local governments stem from the mismatch of 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities. Knowing the local governments are 
constrained by their capacity to raise revenue, the central has to tolerate local 
governments to seek “self-reliant” solutions outside the budget. It’s high time to 
change this situation and form a modern budget management system and a 
well-functioning public sector. The central government may want to write off the debt 
of the local governments as they have done to rescue State-owned banks. Anyway, the 
local governments are in the red because they have to shoulder the fiscal burden for the 
central government. New sources of revenue need to be designed for the local 
governments. For example, local governments bonds should be encouraged since it 
will make the government and people easier to track where and how much public 
money is spent. Next step of the reform requires revamping expenditure assignments, 
revising revenue assignments that includes conferring some real fiscal autonomy on 
local governments in exchange for extending budgetary scrutiny over off budget 
resources, and revising the Budget Law to guarantee these assignments. 
The political leaders also have to work with officials from different departments of 
the Chinese governments. China has taken several rounds of administrative reforms. 
Administrative reform in 1998 downsized the original 40 ministries and committees to 
29, and also downsized 50% of government employees. Chinese government has also 
established a merit based civil service system. In recent years, Chinese government 
does not have any difficulty recruiting excellent and ambitious people. However, in 
many cases, government departments are becoming vest interest groups and the major 
obstacle for further reform. When the top leaders are trying to cool down the 
investment in real estate, the Ministry of Construction, however, often openly show 
their sympathy on the developers. Ministry of Railway, which is responsible for both   24
the pricing and investment of railway transportation, is reluctant to increase investment. 
The coordination of different departments is another headache for the Chinese 
governments. Channels for information sharing are impeded. When one government 
department issues a new policy, they are not required to inform and consulting other 
related departments. Responsibilities of each department often overlap with others and 
at the end, no body takes any responsibility. Government reform should not targeted at 
simplify the administrative structure. A more important task is to redesign the 
organization structure of the government. Some departments have too much 
competency, probably the National Development and Reform Commission ( NDRC) 
which inherit most of the power of the former Planning Commission. Other 
departments, like the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, need to have more 
jurisdiction and independency. No government agency is responsible for the design 
and review of economic policy from a nationwide view. Economic Reform Committee 
used to play this role but was cancelled in the 1998 administrative reform. It may be 
unrealistic to establish new agencies facilitating coordination among different 
departments, but sometimes unified code can be introduced for every department to 
follow, thus reducing the transaction cost in the hierarchy. 
What should international community do to foster the next generation reform in 
China? In the 1980s, international organizations like the World Bank were very active 
and influential in China. Their influence faded off, unfortunately. This is partly 
because of the learning curve, since Chinese officials and experts now know much 
better than before. But it is also because the international communities fail to propose 
policy suggestions attractive to the Chinese government. Rather than the general 
argument that China should pursuer market economy or more economic freedom, 
Chinese politicians need more detailed and tailor made proposals. Such kind of 
proposals should take China’s complicated political, economic and social situation into 
consideration. Outsider’s policy suggestions have often been viewed as naive or 
unrealistic because they did not include those domestic factors. International 
communities can do better by targeting at manageable objectives and provide 
user-friendly analysis. They can also do better by providing international experiences,   25
both the successful and failed examples. One good example is worth a thousand 
theories. This is especially true for most Chinese politicians, because they are trained 
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